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Abstract
In an eﬀort to explain the observed heterogeneity in the exporting decisions of ﬁrms,
the empirical trade literature has concluded that exporting ﬁrms are more productive
than non-exporting ﬁrms. In this paper, I show that the foundation for this conclusion
is weak, given that the productivity estimates used in the literature suﬀer from several
sources of potential bias. I apply a new method for estimating production functions to
control for these sources of bias. Using data on manufacturing ﬁrms in Colombia, I ﬁnd
that, while the measures of productivity used in the literature imply that exporters are
more productive, once I correct for the bias, there is no correlation between produc-
tivity and export status. This result is inconsistent with productivity being the main
determinant of entry into export markets, and suggests the importance of other sources
of heterogeneity in explaining ﬁrm-level exporting decisions.
∗I am grateful to Steven Durlauf, Amit Gandhi, and especially Salvador Navarro for their guidance, com-
ments, and suggestions. Rasmus Lentz, Ben Cowan, and Ignacio Monzón also provided helpful suggestions.
I also wish to thank Amil Petrin for sharing with me the data on Colombian manufacturing ﬁrms.
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1 Introduction
As ﬁrm-level data on exports has become available, an interest in understanding the causes
of the observed heterogeneity in exporting decisions has developed in the empirical trade
literature. One common observation in the data is that, even within narrowly deﬁned in-
dustries, only a small percentage of ﬁrms export. This suggests the existence of some source
of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity that causes certain ﬁrms to export while other ﬁrms do not. The
literature has found that exporting ﬁrms tend to be better in the sense that they sell more
output, hire more workers, are more capital intensive, and are more productive. This last
ﬁnding has become almost a stylized fact in the literature. As a consequence, the literature
has focused on productivity as a key determinant of export status, and has worked to de-
velop models of exporting that can replicate this positive correlation between exporting and
productivity.
In this paper, I show that the evidence for the conclusion that exporters are more pro-
ductive is weak, as the underlying estimates of productivity suﬀer from several sources of
potential bias. As opposed to characteristics such as the number of workers or the amount
of capital, productivity is not directly observable and has to be recovered from the data. I
show that there are several reasons to believe that the measures of productivity commonly
used in the literature are biased. First, the use of value-added speciﬁcations of production
ignores the role of intermediate inputs. Second, a ﬁrm's output is typically only measured
in revenues as opposed to quantities. Failing to properly control for these unobserved prices
leads to biased estimates of productivity. The third source of bias arises due to the common
approach of measuring productivity as the residual from a regression of output on inputs.
When a ﬁrm's input choices are correlated with its productivity shocks, then this causes an
endogeneity problem that leads to biased estimates of productivity.
In this paper, I show that the standard methods for controlling for these sources of
bias cannot be applied in this setting with exporting ﬁrms. As a solution, I develop a
new approach for estimating production functions that accounts for exporting ﬁrms. This
approach is based on the method introduced in Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2009). Using
data on Colombian manufacturing ﬁrms, I ﬁnd that the measures of productivity used in
the literature over-estimate the productivity advantage of exporting ﬁrms relative to non-
exporting ﬁrms. In fact, after controlling for the sources of bias contained in the commonly
used measures, I ﬁnd no diﬀerence in productivity based on export status.
This lack of correlation between productivity and export status is inconsistent with a
model in which heterogeneity in productivity is the primary determinant of export status,
and is suggestive of the existence of alternative drivers of exporting decisions. Additional
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justiﬁcation for this comes from the fact that export intensitiesthe fraction of output
that a ﬁrm exportsexhibit high variance in the data and are highly correlated over time.
Since this cannot be explained by diﬀerences in productivity, this suggests the presence of
an additional source of ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity that is both persistent and related to
exporting decisions. I show that this heterogeneity, which is recoverable from the data, can
enter the model through diﬀerences in the marginal costs and marginal beneﬁts of exporting.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I review the related literature
on exporting and productivity. In Section 3, I discuss the potential sources of bias in the
measures of productivity used in the literature. In Section 4, I compute the two commonly
used measures of productivity using data on Colombian manufacturing ﬁrms, and I discuss
the eﬀect of using value-added as opposed to gross output speciﬁcations of production. In
Section 5, I present a method to control for unobserved prices that accounts for the fact
that ﬁrms sell output both domestically and abroad. In Section 6, I introduce a new method
for estimating production functions that both controls for endogeneity due to unobserved
productivity and allows for gross output speciﬁcations of the production function. Section 7
presents the estimating model that results from assembling all of the components (controlling
for exporting, prices, endogeneity of inputs, and gross output speciﬁcations). In Section 8,
I describe the data, present the empirical results, and discuss the implications for models of
exporting. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature on Exporting and Productivity
There are many empirical papers that examine the relationship between ﬁrm-level produc-
tivity and export status. Most ﬁnd evidence of a positive correlation between the two. This
has prompted a debate as to the cause of this correlation. In a survey of this literature,
covering 45 papers and 33 countries, Wagner (2007) notes that the majority of the literature
supports the hypothesis of self-selection resulting from the presence of ﬁxed costs of entry
into export markets. These ﬁxed costs include identifying and informing potential foreign
customers, learning about relevant foreign laws and standards, and forming relationships
with distributors. Only the most productive ﬁrms ﬁnd the export market suﬃciently prof-
itable to justify paying these ﬁxed costs of exporting, which generates a positive correlation
between exporting and productivity. Bernard and Jensen (1999), Clerides, Lach, and Tybout
(1998), and Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) are the most frequently cited empirical papers
in support of this view.
The theoretical foundation for the hypothesis of self-selection is formalized in Melitz
(2003). Melitz presents a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and analyzes the eﬀects of intra-
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industry trade. Each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerent variety of a good in a monopolistically com-
petitive setting. One implication of this model is that, in the presence of ﬁxed costs of
exporting, opening the economy to trade induces only the most productive ﬁrms to select
into exporting. (In the absence of ﬁxed costs of exporting, all ﬁrms would export in this
model.)
An alternative hypothesis in the literature is that the causation runs in the other direction
that the act of exporting causes increases in ﬁrm-level productivity through learning. Export-
ing ﬁrms learn from international trading partners and competitors and use this knowledge
to increase their productivity. Although this hypothesis has received less support in the
literature, some papers ﬁnd evidence of learning, particularly in developing countries. Both
De Loecker (2007) for Slovenia and Van Biesebroeck (2006) for sub-Saharan Africa ﬁnd ev-
idence that ﬁrm-level productivity increased subsequent to exporting, which supports the
learning hypothesis.
Finally, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) (henceforth BEJK) suggests a third
explanation. In BEJK, geographic barriers, which include transportation costs, language
barriers, and tariﬀs, generate heterogeneous marginal costs of exporting. Within each variety
of a product, ﬁrms compete under Bertrand competition and there are no ﬁxed costs of
exporting. Since domestic ﬁrms do not face these geographic barriers, in order for a foreign
ﬁrm to successfully export, it must be able to price more competitively than the domestic
ﬁrms in the destination country. This implies that, on average, exporting ﬁrms are more
productive than non-exporting ﬁrms.
3 Measures of Productivity
The majority of the empirical trade literature deals with the issue of ﬁrm-level productivity
being unobservable in one of two ways. First, productivity is approximated by labor produc-
tivity, which can usually be measured directly in the data as the ratio of output (measured by
either deﬂated revenues or real value added) to labor input (measured by either real wages,
workers, or hours). In addition to being directly observable, the use of labor productivity
has the advantage of not requiring data on capital levels, functional form assumptions on
the production function, or the estimation of a production function. The main disadvan-
tage of this approach is that labor productivity does not reﬂect true productivity diﬀerences
among ﬁrms. Labor productivity, by construction, is a function of the other inputs. It is
also endogenous as both output and labor input are chosen by the ﬁrm. In response to these
disadvantages, many papers in the literature also attempt to recover measures of total factor
productivity (TFP). Consider a generic production function F (K,L,M), where K denotes
4
capital, L denotes labor, and M denotes intermediate inputs. The amount of output, Q,
that a ﬁrm produces is given by the following expression:
Q = A× F (K,L,M) , (1)
where A denotes TFP.1
A common approach in the literature is to measure TFP as the residual from a linear
regression of the log of real value added on the log of capital and labor. However, there are
several reasons to believe that estimates of productivity generated using this method are
biased, as I explain in what follows.
A lengthy literature in industrial organization is focused on estimating production func-
tions and TFP. The primary concern in this literature, introduced by Marschak and Andrews
(1944), is that if the ﬁrm's input decisions respond to productivity shocks, then input levels
will be correlated with unobserved productivity, leading to an endogeneity bias. This is often
referred to as the transmission bias or simultaneity bias.
A second issue, also ﬁrst suggested by Marschak and Andrews (1944), but not addressed
until more recently by Klette and Griliches (1996), arises because in most datasets the output
price and quantity are not observed separately. Rather, only revenues are observed. Since
revenues are the only measure of output, unobserved prices are also present in the error term.
If a ﬁrm's input choices are correlated with its output price, then an additional potential
endogeneity problem arises, called the omitted price bias. Moreover, even if there was not
an omitted price bias, the residual would still contain both productivity and price, so the
resulting measure of productivity would be confounded with unobserved prices.
A third issue is the use of value-added speciﬁcations of the production function as op-
posed to gross output speciﬁcations. This has received much less attention in the literature.
Nominal value added, VA, is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the value of output (revenue)
and the value of intermediate inputs:
VA = (P ×Q)− (PM ×M) ,
where P is the price of output and PM is the price of intermediate inputs.2 Value added can
then be written as a function of the primary inputs of capital and labor,
1This measure of productivity captures Hicks-neutral diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of ﬁrms. If ﬁrm 1 has
a TFP that is twice that of ﬁrm 2, then with the same amount of inputs, ﬁrm 1 can produce twice as much
output as ﬁrm 2.
2Real value added is calculated by deﬂating nominal value added directly or by deﬂating revenue and the
value of intermediate inputs separately with diﬀerent deﬂators (double-deﬂated value added).
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VA = A˜× F˜ (K,L) , (2)
where F˜ (•) is the value-added production function and A˜ is the value-added approximation
to TFP.
The use of value added as a measure of output is popular for a number of reasons.
First, value added can be aggregated to measure the total output of an industry or set
of industries without double-counting intermediate inputs to production. Second, a value-
added production function relates output to labor and capital (but not intermediate inputs),
which results in fewer parameters to estimate. Third, the recent structural methods for
recovering productivity via the estimation of a production function cannot, in general, handle
gross output speciﬁcations. The reason is that these methods of Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) cannot generally
identify coeﬃcients on intermediate inputs. As a result, intermediate inputs have to be
subtracted out, and a value-added speciﬁcation used.
A problem with value added is that it is not the natural measure of the output of the
technology of a ﬁrm. A ﬁrm transforms inputs (including intermediate inputs) into output.
Without intermediate inputs, output cannot be produced. In addition, by subtracting out
the value of intermediate inputs, value added ignores any potential substitution between
intermediate inputs and the primary inputs of capital and labor.
In addition to concerns about value added as a concept, the value-added speciﬁcation
is generally not a valid approximation to the gross output speciﬁcation. Bruno (1978) and
Basu and Fernald (1995, 1997) show that there is a limited and restrictive set of conditions
under which the parameters of a value-added production function correspond to those of a
gross output production function. In particular, Basu and Fernald (1995, 1997) show that
when the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale are violated,
the parameters of the value-added speciﬁcation do not correspond to those of the gross
output speciﬁcation. Since many of the recent theoretical models of trade involve imperfect
competition and increasing returns to scale, this seems especially problematic.
An additional reason for preferring a gross output speciﬁcation derives from the literature
that attempts to deal with the omitted price bias. When prices are unobserved, and output
is only measured in revenues, demand has to be modeled in order to control for prices.
The problem is that the concept of demand for value added is generally not meaningful.
Consumers have demand for ﬁnal products, and do not care about how much value the ﬁrm
added to the product.
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4 Value-Added versus Gross Output Speciﬁcations
In this section, I ﬁrst replicate the empirical ﬁnding that exporters are more productive than
non-exporters. Using a dataset on Colombian manufacturing ﬁrms, I compute the two most
commonly used measures of productivity in the literature. The data are described in more
detail in Section 8. For each 3-digit industry, I compute labor productivity as real value
added divided by the number of hours worked.3 Following the empirical trade literature, I
also estimate TFP as the residual from an OLS regression of real value added on capital and
hours worked:
vajt = αljt + βkjt + νjt, (3)
where vajt is the log of the real value added of ﬁrm j in period t, ljt is log labor, kjt is
log capital, and the residual νjt is log TFP (which is equal to the log of A˜ from equation
(2)).4 I then calculate the productivity premia of exporters as the percentage diﬀerence in
average productivity between exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms. I report these productivity
premia in Table 1. The results are consistent with the literature. Exporting ﬁrms appear
more productive than non-exporting ﬁrms in almost all industries, and in many cases the
diﬀerences are large. In most cases, the premium is higher for labor productivity, which is
reﬂective of the fact that exporters are on average 7 times larger in terms of capital stocks.
As opposed to labor productivity, the concept of TFP captures true eﬃciency diﬀerences
across ﬁrms. However, estimates of TFP based on value-added may not reﬂect true produc-
tivity diﬀerences due to the strong restrictions underlying the approximation. In order to
examine the empirical relevance of using value-added, I re-estimate TFP by replacing the
value-added speciﬁcation in equation (3) with the following equation for real gross output:
gojt = aljt + bkjt + cmjt + µjt, (4)
where gojt is the deﬂated value of log gross output and the residual µjt is log TFP (which is
equal to the log of A from equation (1)). The resulting productivity premia are presented in
Table 2. As Table 2 illustrates, the productivity premia based on estimates of TFP from a
gross output speciﬁcation tell a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent story than the other two measures. In
most cases the premium based on gross output is smaller than its value-added counterpart,
and in several cases it is negative. The disparate results yielded by the value-added and gross
output speciﬁcations provide evidence that the value-added speciﬁcation is not a good ap-
proximation to the gross output speciﬁcation. Furthermore, the gross output results provide
3In the data, ﬁrms are classiﬁed by industry according to the ISIC Rev. 2 classiﬁcation.
4Throughout this paper I will use lower-case letters to denote logs and upper-case letters to denote levels.
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much weaker evidence for a systematic relationship between exporting and productivity, and
call into question the conclusion that diﬀerences in productivity are the primary driver of
exporting decisions.5
While using gross output speciﬁcations addresses the problem of using meaningful mea-
sures of output when recovering productivity, the exercise is far from complete. As described
earlier, I still need to control for the biases caused by unobserved prices and unobserved pro-
ductivity. I address each of these separately in the next two sections. As a consequence of
the results described above, I will use gross output speciﬁcations for the remainder of my
analysis.
5 Controlling for Unobserved Prices
In empirical work on production function and productivity estimation, it is often assumed
that output measured in quantities can be observed directly. However, in most datasets we
do not observe quantities (or prices) but instead observe only revenues. To see why this
introduces further complications, notice that the log of revenue can be expressed as follows:
rjt = ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)) + ωjt + pjt,
where pjt is output price and ωjt is log TFP. The typical solution in the literature is to use
price deﬂators to transform revenues into quantities. The problem with this approach is that
ﬁrm-speciﬁc price deﬂators are typically not available.6 Therefore, the diﬀerence between
the ﬁrm's price and the price deﬂator, pjt − pt, remains in the error term,
rjt − pt = ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)) + ωjt + (pjt − pt) .
If ﬁrms possess any market power, then deﬂating with an aggregate price index will lead
to biased estimates of the production function and, consequently, biased estimates of ﬁrm-
level productivity. The reason is that pjt − pt reﬂects a ﬁrm's market power, which is likely
correlated with input demands, leading to endogeneity. This is known as the omitted price
bias. Moreover, even if endogeneity was not a concern, there is a more obvious source of
bias in the productivity estimates themselves: they will be the sum of true productivity (ωjt)
and unobserved price deviations (pjt − pt). Consequently, controlling for unobserved prices
5The fact that the gross output speciﬁcation weakens the apparent relationship between productivity and
export status is illustrative of a larger problem. The widespread use of value-added production functions in
the broader literature may be resulting in biased conclusions to other questions which rely on estimating a
production function.
6See Marschak and Andrews (1944) and, for a more recent treatment, Klette and Griliches (1996).
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will be important for both reasons.
In the absence of data on prices, solving this problem requires modeling demand (and
therefore prices). One option is to use a single constant-elasticity residual demand curve.7
However, when some ﬁrms export, these ﬁrms not only sell their goods domestically, but also
abroad. As a result, the use of a single demand function to model prices will not be suﬃcient
to measure the price of the ﬁrm's output, as the average price received by the ﬁrm is a
weighted average of the domestic and foreign prices. In fact, using a single demand system
will over-estimate the relative productivity advantage of exporting ﬁrms. The intuition for
this can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Inferring Price and Quantity from a Single Demand
Suppose that we observe a ﬁrm earning total revenues R. By ignoring the foreign market
and using a single domestic demand curve, a quantity Q and price P (Q) are inferred.8 Given
a function for the costs of production, C (Q), the implied proﬁts are Π (Q) = R − C (Q).
If that ﬁrm is exporting some of its output, and there are any costs of exporting, then the
ﬁrm must be making a higher proﬁt (excluding these costs of exporting) than Π (Q). In
order for proﬁts to be higher, the costs of production must be lower than C (Q). Under
the assumption that the cost function is strictly increasing in quantity, this implies that the
total quantity (across both markets) being produced by the exporting ﬁrm is Q˜ < Q. As a
result, since the model over-estimates the quantity that this exporting ﬁrm is producing, it
will over-estimate the true productivity of that ﬁrm. This is crucial since it directly biases
7See Klette and Griliches (1996) and De Loecker (2009) for examples.
8The constant-elasticity demand generates a revenue function that is strictly increasing in quantity.
Therefore, a given revenue implies a unique quantity.
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the relationship I am interested in examining in favor of the common ﬁnding that exporters
are more productive.
5.1 Model of Prices
In order to control for unobserved prices, I model domestic and foreign demand separately
using a standard approach in the trade literature. Within a given industry, ﬁrms are assumed
to produce horizontally diﬀerentiated products and compete in a monopolistically compet-
itive setting. Firms face symmetric constant-elasticity demand curves. There are separate
domestic and foreign markets.9 The demand functions are given by the following equations:
PDjt = P
D
t
(
QDjt
Q
D
t
) 1
η
; PEjt = τP
E
t
(
QEjt
Q
E
t
) 1
η
, (5)
where Qt is an aggregate demand shifter related to industry demand at time t,
10 P t is the
price deﬂator, Qjt and Pjt are the ﬁrm-speciﬁc quantity and price, and τ denotes marginal
costs of exporting.11 Superscript D denotes variables related to the domestic market, and
superscript E denotes variables related to the export market. The elasticity of demand, η, is
assumed to be the same in both markets.12 Both domestic and foreign prices are measured
in nominal units of the domestic currency.13 In Section 7, I show how these demands are
used to control for unobserved prices when estimating productivity.
6 Controlling for Endogeneity Due to Unobserved Pro-
ductivity
As stated earlier, the concern that inputs are endogenous due to their correlation with unob-
served productivity has received a lot of attention in the industrial organization literature.
Several methods have been suggested for dealing with this endogeneity.14 If instruments
9This is the setting, for example, in Melitz (2003), with the exception that in that paper there are N
symmetric foreign markets. For simplicity, I focus on one foreign market. The results of this paper can be
generalized to account for multiple foreign markets.
10I form the quantity index as a weighted-average of deﬂated revenues, where the weights are the market
shares.
11This is the standard iceberg assumption that the marginal costs of exporting are proportional to the
value of output that is exported.
12This assumption can also be relaxed to allow for the elasticity of demand in the domestic market to
diﬀer from the elasticity of demand in the foreign market. It complicates the algebra and adds one more
parameter to estimate, but all of the results that I show in the paper still hold.
13This implies that the foreign price deﬂator also captures the exchange rate.
14For a summary of these methods and their relative advantages and disadvantages, see Griliches and
Mairesse (1998).
10
are available, then instrumental variables techniques are a natural solution. However, valid
instruments for the endogenous inputs, such as input prices, are not typically available. An-
other approach is to use panel data techniques, but if productivity varies across both ﬁrms
and time, then it cannot be totally diﬀerenced out as ﬁxed eﬀects, and the remaining resid-
ual term is still correlated with inputs. In addition, panel data methods remove a lot of the
variation in the data, which is needed to identify the parameters of the model.
This leaves the recently-developed proxy variable methods of Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006).15 However, for
my setting, these methods cannot be employed either. The reason, as I discuss below, is
that they cannot generally be used to estimate gross output speciﬁcations of the production
function. This is due to a problem with the identiﬁcation of coeﬃcients related to static
and competitive inputs that occurs with this approach. This is particularly important given
both the empirical evidence in Section 4 regarding the use of value-added versus gross output
speciﬁcations, and the fact that I need to model demand (for gross output) to control for
unobserved prices.
To illustrate, I brieﬂy describe the proxy variable approach. The key insight of these
methods is that the ﬁrm's demand for a proxy variable λjt (either investment in physical
capital or intermediate input demand) is a monotonic function of the state variables of the
ﬁrm, productivity ωjt and capital kjt:
16
λjt = gt (ωjt, kjt) .
Since this relationship is a strictly monotonic function of just one unobservable, it can be
inverted to express the unobserved productivity in terms of observable variables,
ωjt = g
−1
t (λjt, kjt) .
This expression for productivity then replaces productivity in the production function. Tem-
porarily ignoring unobserved prices, log quantity can be expressed as follows:
yjt = qjt + εjt = ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)) + g
−1
t (λjt, kjt) + εjt,
where qjt denotes anticipated output in quantities and yjt denotes observed output that
is subject to ex-post productivity shocks and/or measurement error, εjt. This equation no
15An alternative to estimating productivity is to recover TFP using an index number approach. These
techniques do not suﬀer from endogeneity concerns as they do not involve running a regression. However,
they impose several potentially strong assumptions in order to recover TFP, such as constant returns to scale
and perfect competition in the input and output markets.
16In Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006), labor is also assumed to be a state variable.
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longer suﬀers from endogeneity as εjt is assumed to be uncorrelated with inputs. In addition,
it separates εjt from ωjt, as ωjt does not appear on the right-hand side.
The model also assumes that productivity evolves according to a ﬁrst-order Markov
process,
ωjt = ht (ωjt−1) + ξjt. (6)
The innovations to productivity, ξjt, are assumed to be independent of all inputs that are
determined before ξjt is realized. Then, for a given vector of the parameters of the production
function and the inverted proxy equation
(
g−1t (•)
)
, productivity can be formed, and the
regression in equation (6) can be computed. The residual of this regression is then interacted
with moments to estimate the parameters.
The problem with these methods, as recently pointed out in Bond and Söderbom (2005)
and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006), is that they cannot generally be used to identify
the coeﬃcients on static and competitive inputs. The reason is that there is nothing in the
model that varies these inputs (e.g., intermediate inputs) separately from productivity and
the other inputs.17 As a result, a value-added speciﬁcation, where intermediate inputs are
subtracted out and then ignored, has to be used when employing these methods.
6.1 The Share Equation Approach
Since a gross output production function is required for the problem at hand, I need a
method that can estimate gross output models. Since none of the methods in the literature
can be applied to the problem I study, I apply a new method for estimating production
functions from Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2009) (henceforth GNR). This method controls
for endogeneity due to unobserved productivity in a gross output setting. I generalize the
approach developed in GNR to a setting of imperfect competition in which there are both
domestic and foreign markets. I also show how this method can be extended to deal with
the complications due to the presence of unobserved prices when some ﬁrms are exporting.
The key insight of GNR is that there is important unused information contained in the
17Under some speciﬁc assumptions on the data generating process, the proxy variable method can be
used when investment is the proxy variable. However, using investment as the proxy requires dropping all
observations for which there is zero investment in physical capital. This can lead to a signiﬁcant loss of data,
as pointed out by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). In my dataset, this would result in a loss of 40% of the
observations.
In addition to the loss of data, the use of these methods would require the existence of a speciﬁc source
of variation in demand for intermediate inputs. In particular, this source of variation would have to either
have no dynamic eﬀects, or would have to be observable. If the source of variation was unobserved and
had dynamic eﬀects, then this would invalidate the necessary assumption that productivity is the only
unobservable that aﬀects investment decisions.
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ﬁrm's input shares. The shares not only provide identifying information for the parameters
of the production function but also allow for richer forms of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity.18 To
keep the analysis straightforward, I ﬁrst illustrate the method under the assumption that
ﬁrms are perfectly competitive in the output market, which is the setting typically analyzed
in the literature on production function estimation.
For a generic production technology, consider a ﬁrm's maximization problem with respect
to a static and competitive input, such as intermediate inputs, Mjt:
max
Mjt
PjtQjt − PMt Mjt = max
Mjt
PjtF (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt) e
ωjt − PMt Mjt.
This results in the following ﬁrst-order condition:
PjtFM (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt) e
ωjt − PMt = 0,
where FM (•) denotes the partial derivative of F (•) with respect to intermediate inputs, M .
Notice that the ﬁrst-order condition contains both unobserved output prices and unobserved
productivity. These are the two sources of endogeneity that are causing problems in the
estimation to begin with. However, this expression can be re-arranged in terms of the share
of intermediate inputs in total revenue:
PMt Mjt
PjtQjt
=
FM (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)×Mjt
F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)
. (7)
As equation (7) shows, the shares of intermediate inputs can be expressed in terms of the pro-
duction function, the ﬁrst derivative of the production function with respect to intermediate
inputs, and the level of intermediate inputs.
Taking logs, replacing the product of price and quantity with revenue, and accounting
for ex-post productivity shocks and measurement error yields what GNR calls the share
equation:
sjt ≡ ln
(
PMt Mjt
Rjt
)
= ln (FM (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt))− ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)) +mjt − εjt, (8)
where Rjt denotes observed revenues. This equation separates εjt from ωjt (note that ωjt,
which appeared in the ﬁrst-order condition, is now contained in the left-hand side term) and
18See Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2009) for a discussion of the beneﬁts of being able to allow for other
forms of unobserved heterogeneity (in addition to productivity).
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collapses unobserved prices within observed revenues. Furthermore, it provides an additional
source of identifying information for the production function directly through the ﬁrst term:
the derivative of the production function with respect to intermediate inputs. The share
equation together with the production function can be used to express the two unobservables,
εjt and ωjt, as a function of the parameters of the production function:
19
sjt ≡ ln
(
PMt Mjt
Rjt
)
= ln (FM (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt))− ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)) +mjt − εjt
yjt = ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)) + ωjt + εjt
The same assumption made in the proxy variable methodsthat productivity evolves in
a Markovian fashioncan be used to form estimates of the innovation to productivity, ξjt.
Moments with both εjt and ξjt can then be formed to recover the production function and
hence ﬁrm-level productivity (ωjt).
6.1.1 Imperfect Competition
The approach developed in GNR generalizes well to other speciﬁcations of the underlying
model and can be used under various data restrictions (e.g., observing only revenues as
opposed to quantities). In particular, it can handle imperfect competition. When ﬁrms
charge constant markups, which is the case with the constant elasticity of demand curves I
introduced in Section 5.1, the share equation remains the same, with the exception of one
additional term, which is the log of the markup:20
sjt ≡ ln
(
PMt Mjt
Rjt
)
= ln (FM (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt))− ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt))+mjt− ln
(
η
η + 1
)
−εjt.
(9)
Moreover, the share equation is the same for both exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms.21
These results highlight an appealing feature of the approach in GNR: relaxing assumptions
within this framework results in equations that are still easy to use.
19Note that equation (8) could be estimated directly and non-parametrically without specifying a functional
form for the production function. The right-hand side of the equation is just a function of the inputs to
production and measurement error, which is uncorrelated with inputs.
20With the constant-elasticity demand system, the markup that ﬁrms optimally charge is
(
η
η+1
)
, where
η is the elasticity of demand.
21The fact that the share equation does not depend on export status is a result of the assumption that the
domestic and foreign demand elasticities are the same. When this assumption is relaxed, the share equation
for exporters becomes a slightly more complicated function that includes an extra parameterthe foreign
demand elasticitybut the intuition and results of the model still hold.
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Thus far I have shown how the share equation can be used to control for the endogeneity
due to unobserved productivity. I have also shown how the share equation can be modiﬁed
to account for both imperfect competition and exporting. The remaining step is to use
the model of demand from Section 5.1 to control for unobserved prices in the production
function.
7 The Empirical Model: Revenues and Exporting
In this section, I assemble all of the pieces: the demand systems to control for unobserved
prices, the share equation to control for endogeneity of inputs due to unobserved productivity,
and the gross output speciﬁcation. I begin by showing that the revenue production function
needs to be adjusted to account for the diﬀerent sources of revenues. I then show how to
solve the problem that this createsby pairing the demand systems introduced in Section
5.1 with the ﬁrm's optimal allocation of output across the domestic and foreign markets.
This leads to what I call the domestic revenue production function, which paired with the
share equation, constitutes my empirical model.
As I discussed in Section 5, when some ﬁrms export, their revenues come from both
domestic and foreign markets, each with their own demands. Total revenues for exporting
ﬁrms are then the sum of domestic and foreign revenues. By replacing the prices using the
demand systems in Section 5.1, total revenues can be expressed as follows:
Rjt = R
D
jt +R
E
jt = P
D
jtQ
D
jt + P
E
jtQ
E
jt
=
P
D
t(
Q
D
t
) 1
η
(
QDjt
)1+ 1
η + τ
P
E
t(
Q
E
t
) 1
η
(
QEjt
)1+ 1
η .
Two main problems with this expression prevent it from being used directly. First, marginal
costs of exporting, τ , are not observed. Second, there is no model for the quantity of output
sold on the domestic market, QDjt, separate from the quantity of output sold on the foreign
market, QEjt. There is only a model for total quantity: the production function. In order to
address these challenges, I derive a model for the domestic revenues of the ﬁrms separately
from the foreign revenues. In doing so, I am able to estimate the elasticity of demand
and all of the parameters of the production function, including unobserved productivity.
I accomplish this by taking advantage of another static ﬁrst-order condition of the ﬁrm.
Speciﬁcally, I look at the ﬁrm's maximization problem with respect to its allocation of
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output between the domestic and foreign markets.
I deﬁne the fraction of a ﬁrm's physical output that is sold on the domestic market as
θjt =
QDjt
QDjt +Q
E
jt
.
As I show in Appendix A, when the elasticities of demand are the same in both markets,
ﬁrms choose to allocate output such that the prices received by the ﬁrm in both markets are
equal. Since the prices are equal, this implies that the division of quantities across markets,
which is not observed in the data, is equal to the division of revenues across markets, which
is observed in the data.22 As a result, I can derive an expression for domestic quantity as a
function of the division of revenues and the production function,
QDjt = θjt ×Qjt =
(
RDjt
RDjt +R
E
jt
)
× F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)× eωjt .
By using the domestic demand curve, I can obtain a model for the observed measure of
domestic output (i.e., domestic revenues). The log of deﬂated domestic revenues, r˜Djt , is
given by the following equation:
r˜Djt =
(
1 +
1
η
)
ln
(
RDjt
RDjt +R
E
jt
)
− 1
η
qDt +
(
1 +
1
η
)
[ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)) + ωjt] + εjt.
This equation controls for unobserved prices when some ﬁrms are exporting. Additionally,
when combined with the share equation, it controls for endogeneity due to unobserved pro-
ductivity, all within a gross output setting.
Putting the two equations together yields the set of estimating equations:
sjt = ln (FM (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt))− ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)) +mjt − ln
(
η
η+1
)
− εjt
r˜Djt =
(
1 + 1
η
)
ln
(
RDjt
RDjt+R
E
jt
)
− 1
η
qDt +
(
1 + 1
η
)
[ln (F (Kjt, Ljt,Mjt)) + ωjt] + εjt.
(10)
Note that the share in the ﬁrst equation is a function of nominal total revenues, and the
dependent variable of the second equation is deﬂated domestic revenues.
22When the elasticities of demand in the domestic and foreign markets are not the same, the ratio of prices
is equal to the ratio of the markups.
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7.1 Learning-by-Exporting
As discussed in Section 2, some papers in the trade literature suggest that exporting leads
to an increase in a ﬁrm's productivity. If this is the case, then the process governing the
evolution of productivity is now a controlled Markov process, as a ﬁrm's decision about
whether or not to export has an eﬀect on its realization of productivity. This needs to be
taken into account in the estimation strategy. Under the timing assumption that lagged
export status, Djt−1, aﬀects the realization of productivity, the process for productivity can
be written as follows:23
ωjt = h˜ (ωjt−1, Djt−1) + ξjt. (11)
Testing for the presence of learning-by-exporting is therefore embedded directly into the
estimation procedure.
8 Data and Estimation Results
8.1 Data
My data come from an annual census of Colombian manufacturing plants over the period
1981-1991. The data cover all ﬁrms with 10 or more employees. This dataset has been used
previously in several studies (for example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Clerides, Lach,
and Tybout (1998)) and contains information about each plant's capital stocks, investment
ﬂows, expenditures on labor and intermediate inputs, number of workers, wages, value of
total output, and value of output that is exported.
For the structural estimates I focus on the largest 3-digit industry, which is Apparel (in-
dustry 322). Since I model ﬁrms as being monopolistically competitive, I need an industry
that contains a large number of ﬁrms for this assumption to be valid. Additionally, choosing
the largest industry yields the most observations for the estimation. After dropping obser-
vations with missing values, a total of 4,490 observations remain for 732 ﬁrms, of which 18%
exported in at least one year. In Table 3, I report some summary statistics for the data.
8.2 Parametrization
So far, my discussion of the method of GNR that I employ has not relied on any functional
form assumptions on the production function. In my estimation, I use a CES speciﬁcation
23In the estimation procedure I assume that h˜ (ωjt−1, Djt−1) is linear and additively separable in its
arguments. I can allow for more general functions of ω and D. The only key assumption here is separability.
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of the production function. The parametric versions of the share equation and the domestic
revenue production function for CES are:
sjt ≡ ln
(
PMt Mjt
Rjt
)
= − ln (αlLρjt + αkKρjt + αmMρjt)+ ln (αmr)− ln( ηη+1)+ ρmjt − εjt
r˜Djt =
(
1 + 1
η
)
ln
(
RDjt
RDjt+R
E
jt
)
+
(
1 + 1
η
)
r
ρ
ln
(
αlL
ρ
jt + αkK
ρ
jt + αmM
ρ
jt
)
+
(
1 + 1
η
)
ωjt − 1ηqDt + εjt,
(12)
where αl, αk and αm are share parameters, ρ is the CES parameter (
(
1
1−ρ
)
is the elasticity
of substitution), and r is returns to scale.
8.3 Parameters of the Revenue Production Function
As a ﬁrst step, I estimate a baseline version of the model under the assumption that ﬁrms
are perfectly competitive. In this setting, all price variation is captured by the time-varying
price index, so unobserved prices are perfectly controlled for by the price index. As a result,
only endogeneity due to unobserved productivity needs to be controlled for. To do this, I
implement a version of the share equation method under perfect competition. The estimating
equations in this setting are:
sjt ≡ ln
(
PMt Mjt
Rjt
)
= − ln (αlLρjt + αkKρjt + αmMρjt)+ ln (αmr) + ρmjt − εjt
yjt =
r
ρ
ln
(
αlL
ρ
jt + αkK
ρ
jt + αmM
ρ
jt
)
+
(
1 + 1
η
)
ωjt + εjt,
(13)
where yjt is total deﬂated revenues. The results for the baseline model are presented in Table
4.
The coeﬃcients on each of the inputs in the production function (αl, αk, αm) are not
robust to diﬀerences in the scaling of inputs. As a result, I report mean input elasticities
with respect to each of the inputs, as opposed to the parameter estimates themselves.24
Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates.25
The results for the baseline model are reasonable. Output is most elastic with respect
to intermediate inputs, and the labor elasticity is about twice that of capital. The CES
24In fact, the sum of these three parameters is not separately identiﬁed from the mean of productivity.
Because of this, I normalize the sum of the three parameters to be one, and deﬁne αm = 1− αl − αk.
25Standard errors for the share parameters (not shown), returns to scale, and the CES parameter are
based on the asymptotic distribution. For the input elasticities and the elasticity of demand, standard errors
are computed by sampling 5,000 sets of parameters from their asymptotic distribution, constructing these
elasticities, and computing the standard deviation of the resulting elasticities.
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parameter suggests an elasticity of substitution that is larger than for Cobb-Douglas. The
results also suggest that the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. There is no
estimate for the elasticity of demand or markups since ﬁrms are assumed to be perfectly
competitive. These results are in line with typical production function estimates in the
literature, which ﬁnd roughly constant returns to scale and labor elasticities that are about
twice as large as capital elasticities.
In Table 4, I present the estimates of the full model (equation (12)) where I account for all
of the potential sources of bias. The estimates for the full model do not diﬀer much in terms
of the input elasticities or the CES parameter. The biggest diﬀerence is in the estimates of
returns to scale and market power. I ﬁnd moderate increasing returns to scale as well as
markups of about 11%.26 These results are consistent with other papers in the literature
that address the omitted price bias (e.g., Klette and Griliches (1996), Gandhi, Navarro,
and Rivers (2009), and De Loecker (2009)). In addition these results are consistent with
the recent trade theory in which ﬁrms face downward-sloping demand curves and exhibit
increasing returns to scale.
8.4 Learning-by-Exporting
As I discussed in Section 7.1, I can directly test for evidence of learning-by-exporting by
explicitly allowing the evolution of productivity to depend on lagged export status. I use
the following speciﬁcation for the process on productivity in the estimation:
ωjt = δ0 + δ1ωjt−1 + δ2Djt−1 + ξjt,
where the estimate of δ2 denotes the percentage increase in productivity due to exporting in
the previous period. The point estimate for δ2 is -0.4% and is not statistically diﬀerent from
zero, which implies a lack of evidence for learning in the data. This result is not surprising
given, as I show next, that I ﬁnd no correlation between exporting and productivity.
8.5 Productivity Comparison
Given the parameter estimates from the full model, which corrects for the transmission bias,
the omitted price bias with exporting, and the bias from using a value-added rather than
a gross output speciﬁcation, I can recover an unbiased estimate of total factor productivity
26It is not surprising that I ﬁnd increasing returns to scale given that I ﬁnd evidence of market power.
The baseline model, which ignores unobserved prices, ﬁnds constant returns to scale. That means that if a
ﬁrm doubles it inputs, it doubles its output, which is measured as deﬂated revenues. However, if that ﬁrm
has market power, then as it increases its output, its price decreases. Therefore, in order for a doubling of
inputs to lead to a doubling of revenues, there must be increasing returns to scale in production.
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for each ﬁrm. These estimates identify diﬀerences in eﬃciency across ﬁrms separately from
diﬀerences in input levels or size. Using these estimates, I compute the productivity premia
for exporters. I deﬁne a ﬁrm to be an exporter in each year in which the ﬁrm exports a
positive amount, and a non-exporter in all other years. I ﬁnd that exporters are not more
productive than non-exporters. I present this result in Table 5. For comparison, I also
report the productivity premia for the Apparel industry (322) that were derived from the
two common measures of productivity in the empirical trade literature: labor productivity
and TFP measured as the residual from a OLS regression of log value added on log inputs.
(These results were originally reported in Table 1.) Standard errors for the estimated premia
are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.27
The point estimate from the full model suggests that exporters are 1% less productive
than non-exporters, although the estimate is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. This result
diﬀers sharply from the productivity premia obtained by measuring productivity as labor
productivity or as the residual from an OLS regression of value added on inputs, which imply
large statistically signiﬁcant productivity advantages for exporters.
Since one might be concerned that these results, which compare mean productivity across
export status, are driven by outliers and are not representative of the entire distribution, I
also report the distributions of productivity by export status. These are reported in Figure
2. Although there is more variation in productivity for exporters, the distributions look very
similar, which suggests that there are no systematic diﬀerences between exporting ﬁrms and
non-exporting ﬁrms in terms of productivity.
8.6 Implications for Models of Exporting
Once unbiased estimates of total factor productivity are obtained, exporters no longer appear
to be more productive than non-exporters. This suggests that diﬀerences in technological
eﬃciency are not the primary determinant of export status. This begs the question that, if
productivity diﬀerences do not explain heterogeneous exporting decisions, then what does?
One possibility is diﬀerences in capital stock. As shown in Figure 3, exporters are on average
much larger, in terms of capital, than non-exporters.
This is consistent with the basic mechanism in Melitz's model as he does not include
capital in the model. If capital is not perfectly ﬂexible, then persistent diﬀerences in capital
27For the productivity premia based on labor productivity and TFP from a value-added OLS speciﬁcation,
standard errors are computed via the non-parametric bootstrap. For the productivity premium based on
TFP estimates from the full model using gross output, standard errors are computed by sampling 5,000
sets of parameters from their asymptotic distribution, computing ﬁrm-level productivity, computing the
productivity premium for exporters, and then calculating the standard deviation of the resulting premia
over the 5,000 samples.
20
Figure 2: Distribution of TFP by Export Status
stocks will operate like diﬀerences in productivity and generate the same type of selection
into exporting, with the selection being on capital, rather than productivity. However, as
Figure 3 illustrates, diﬀerences in capital are not suﬃcient to explain exporting decisions, as
there are many large ﬁrms that do not export, and some small ﬁrms that do. This suggests
that some other form of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity must be important in determining exporting
decisions.
One beneﬁt of the model that I have derived is that it contains additional information
that suggests the potential sources of this heterogeneity. In Section 7, I showed how the
model can be used to compute the share of total output that is sold on the domestic market,
θjt. In Figure 4, I present a histogram of export intensity (the percentage of output sold on
the foreign market), 1 − θjt , conditional on a ﬁrm being an exporter. The ﬁgure is for the
Apparel industry, but similar patterns hold in other industries.
As Figure 4 illustrates, there is a lot of heterogeneity in export intensity. This hetero-
geneity cannot be explained by diﬀerences in either productivity or capital stocks. Export
intensity is only a function of the relative marginal revenues of the markets. Recall the
demand equations from Section 5.1:
PDjt = P
D
t
(
QDjt
Q
D
t
) 1
η
; PEjt = τP
E
t
(
QEjt
Q
E
t
) 1
η
.
As I show in Appendix A, proﬁt maximization implies setting the marginal revenues equal
to each other. This in turn implies that the optimal fraction of quantity sold on the domestic
market, θ∗jt, is given by the following equation:
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Figure 3: Capital Stock by Export Status
θ∗jt =
τ P
Eη
t
Q
E
t
τ P
Eη
t
Q
E
t
+ P
Dη
t
Q
D
t
, (14)
which is just a function of the relative price and quantity indices and the marginal exporting
costs.
So far I have presented the marginal costs of exporting and the foreign price and quantity
indices as varying across time but not across ﬁrm. However, none of my results have relied
on this assumption. Rather, this was for clarity in the exposition. If diﬀerent ﬁrms export
to diﬀerent countries and face diﬀerent transportation costs, then these terms capturing the
marginal costs and marginal beneﬁts of exporting will be heterogeneous across ﬁrms as well.
All of this heterogeneity can be expressed by an index,
pijt ≡ τjt ×
P
E
jt(
Q
E
jt
) 1
η
,
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Figure 4: Export Intensity
where the terms on the right hand side are allowed to vary by ﬁrm.
By looking at the counterpart to the domestic revenue production function, we can see
how this heterogeneity enters the model. Foreign revenues are given by the following equa-
tion:
rEjt = ln
(
τjt × P
E
jt(
Q
E
jt
) 1
η
)
+
(
1 + 1
η
)
ln (1− θjt)
+
(
1 + 1
η
) [
r
ρ
ln
(
αlL
ρ
jt + αkK
ρ
jt + αmM
ρ
jt
)
+ ωjt
]
+ εjt.
(15)
By substituting in pijt, equation (15) can be written as a function of this heterogeneity,
rEjt = ln (pijt) +
(
1 + 1
η
)
ln (1− θjt)
+
(
1 + 1
η
) [
r
ρ
ln
(
αlL
ρ
jt + αkK
ρ
jt + αmM
ρ
jt
)
+ ωjt
]
+ εjt.
(16)
I can now obtain an estimate of pijt directly from equation (16). Note that I already have
estimates of all of the other parameters of equation (16) from the estimation of the domestic
revenue production function. I also have an estimate of TFP (ωjt) and of the ex-post pro-
ductivity/measurement error term (εjt). In Figure 5, I plot this measure of the underlying
export-related heterogeneity, pijt.
Not surprisingly, there is a lot of heterogeneity in pijt. In addition, I ﬁnd that pijt is highly
persistent over time, with an average correlation coeﬃcient of 0.85. This persistence suggests
that this underlying heterogeneity is not random noise but rather evidence of persistent
diﬀerences across ﬁrms that aﬀect exporting decisions. In particular, this suggests that
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Figure 5: Export-Related Heterogeneity
diﬀerences in the geography of trade (through diﬀerences in destination and marginal costs
of exporting) are important determinants of ﬁrm-level exporting decisions.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the empirical ﬁnding that exporting ﬁrms are more productive than
non-exporting ﬁrms. I replicate this stylized fact on data for Colombian manufacturing ﬁrms
using two commonly used measures of productivity from the trade literature. However, I
show that these commonly used productivity measures are potentially biased due to both
the use of value-added speciﬁcations of the production function and endogeneity caused by
productivity and prices being unobserved and unaccounted for. I ﬁnd evidence that the
measures of productivity used in the literature over-estimate the productivity advantage of
exporting ﬁrms. By extending a new strategy for estimating production functions, I am able
to control for unobserved productivity and unobserved prices within a gross output setting.
There are two key ﬁndings in this paper. First, I ﬁnd that once unbiased productivity
estimates are obtained, exporting ﬁrms no longer appear more productive than non-exporting
ﬁrms. In fact, the distributions of productivity across export status are very similar. This
suggests that productivity is not the main determinant of exporting decisions. Consequently,
some other form of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity is driving exporting decisions. Second, using data
on export intensity, I show that heterogeneity associated with diﬀerences in the geographic
barriers faced by ﬁrms can explain exporting decisions. While the ﬁrst ﬁnding alone does
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not refute that ﬁxed costs of exporting are a determinant of export status, it does show
that they may not be as important as commonly believed. Furthermore, the second ﬁnding
suggests that a model of exporting that ignores other sources of heterogeneity will miss key
facts in the data. Together, these two results suggest that future research should emphasize
the role that geography plays in determining patterns in ﬁrm-level exporting decisions.
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Table 1: Export Productivity PremiaColombia
Measure \ Industry 311 312 313 314 321 322 323 324 331 332
Labor ProductivityVA 655% 118% 183% 151% 46% 43% 20% 27% 57% 11%
TFPVA 368% 15% 114% -17% -3% 17% -5% 24% 36% 25%
Measure \ Industry 341 342 351 352 353 354 355 356 361 362
Labor ProductivityVA 89% 96% 46% 88% -37% 379% 80% 71% 300% 124%
TFPVA -3% 43% 20% 27% 1% 127% -5% 14% 4% 6%
Measure \ Industry 369 371 372 381 382 383 384 385 390 Mean
Labor ProductivityVA 95% 196% 113% 85% 38% 88% 77% 73% 46% 116%
TFPVA 20% 6% 49% 16% 10% 14% 21% 5% 20% 33%
Firms are classiﬁed by industry according to the ISIC Rev. 2 classiﬁcation.
Labor ProductivityVA is based on estimates of labor productivity computed as real value-added per worker. TFPVA is
based on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a regression of log real value-added on log capital and log labor.
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Table 2: Export Productivity PremiaColombia
Measure \ Industry 311 312 313 314 321 322 323 324 331 332
Labor ProductivityVA 655% 118% 183% 151% 46% 43% 20% 27% 57% 11%
TFPVA 368% 15% 114% -17% -3% 17% -5% 24% 36% 25%
TFPGO 23% 0% 52% 0% 1% 3% -4% 2% 14% 4%
Measure \ Industry 341 342 351 352 353 354 355 356 361 362
Labor ProductivityVA 89% 96% 46% 88% -37% 379% 80% 71% 300% 124%
TFPVA -3% 43% 20% 27% 1% 127% -5% 14% 4% 6%
TFPGO 2% 9% -3% 2% 10% 4% 3% 4% 1% -1%
Measure \ Industry 369 371 372 381 382 383 384 385 390 Mean
Labor ProductivityVA 95% 196% 113% 85% 38% 88% 77% 73% 46% 116%
TFPVA 20% 6% 49% 16% 10% 14% 21% 5% 20% 33%
TFPGO 5% 1% 9% 4% -1% 4% 8% 1% 2% 5%
Firms are classiﬁed by industry according to the ISIC Rev. 2 classiﬁcation.
Labor ProductivityVA is based on estimates of labor productivity computed as real value-added per worker. TFPVA is
based on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a regression of log real value-added on log capital and log labor.
TFPGO is based on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a regression of log real gross output on log capital, log
labor, and log intermediate inputs.
28
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Colombian Apparel Firms
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Gross Output 49.2 148.7
Value Added 21.3 63.4
Capital Stock 10.3 35.7
Number of Workers 82.3 163.4
Wages 10.7 26.3
Value of Intermediate Input 27.9 88.1
Percentage of Output Exported 9.8% 28.8%
Percentage of Output Exported (Exporters Only) 41.7% 37.8%
All ﬁgures are reported in thousands of 1981 pesos, with the exception of percentage of output exported and
number of workers.
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Table 4: Production Function Parameter EstimatesApparel
Mean Mean Mean
L Elas. K Elas. M Elas. r ρ η Markup
Baseline Model 0.30 0.15 0.53 0.99 0.79  
(0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)  
Full Model 0.29 0.20 0.59 1.08 0.82 -10.40 1.11
(0.08) (0.09) (0.18) (0.27) (0.07) (27.34) (0.33)
r : returns to scale
ρ : CES parameter (elasticity of substitution = 1
1−ρ)
η : elasticity of demand
Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.
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Table 5: Export Productivity PremiaApparel
Productivity
Measure Diﬀerence
Labor ProductivityValue-Added 43%
(0.08)
TFPValue-AddedOLS 17%
(0.06)
TFPGross OutputFull Model -1%
(0.13)
Labor ProductivityValue-Added is based on estimates of labor productivity computed as real value-added
per worker. TFPValue-AddedOLS is based on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a
regression of log real value-added on log capital and log labor. TFPGross OutputFull Model is based
on estimates of TFP computed as the residual from a regression of log real gross output on log capital, log
labor, and log intermediate inputs.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the point estimates.
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Appendix A: Optimal Allocation of Output
Conditional on a ﬁrm deciding to export, it must determine how to optimally allocate quan-
tity to the domestic and foreign markets. Since goods sold on the domestic and foreign
markets share the same production technology, their marginal costs are the same. There-
fore, proﬁt maximization implies that the ﬁrm wants to set the marginal revenue in the
domestic market equal to the marginal revenue in the foreign market. Given the demands
in equation (5), domestic marginal revenue can be derived as follows:
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Similarly, foreign marginal revenue is equal to:
MREjt =
(
1 +
1
η
)
PEjt .
Consequently, setting the marginal revenues equal to each other implies setting the prices
equal to each other.
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By replacing QDjt with θjt×Qjt and QEjt with (1− θjt)×Qjt, I obtain the following expression:
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Solving this expression for θjt yields the expression for the optimal fraction of quantity sold
on the domestic market, θ∗jt:
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τ P
Eη
t
Q
E
t
τ P
Eη
t
Q
E
t
+ P
Dη
t
Q
D
t
,
which is just a function of the transportation costs and the price and quantity indices in
both markets.
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